Thursday, May 22, 2025

Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology

Are Early Abortions Wrong? Ethical Theories, Consciousness, and the Moral Irrelevance of Biology

Many people believe that abortion is wrong because it involves ending the life of a biologically human organism. However, philosophical investigation into the ethics of abortion suggests that this stance is mistaken, especially when we consider early abortions, which constitute the majority of abortion cases. 

This essay argues that early abortions are not wrong because major ethical theories—such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—do not condemn early abortion. The reason is that early fetuses and embryos are not conscious or rational beings, and thus, these ethical theories do not regard them as possessing morally relevant features. Morally relevant features include capacities such as consciousness, sentience, rationality, and the ability to value one’s own existence (or anything, for that matter).

Insofar as what can reasonably be seen as the best explanations of what makes actions wrong do not condemn early abortion, we have good reason to think that early abortion is not wrong. Since actions that are not wrong should not be illegal, this helps justify the view that early abortions—indeed, most abortions—should be legal.

1. The common anti-abortion argument and its flaws

A central argument against abortion is that fetuses are biologically human and therefore abortion is morally wrong. This argument is typically expressed in a syllogism:

  1. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.

  2. Fetuses are innocent human beings.

  3. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.

This argument equivocates on the term “human being.” On one reading, “human being” refers to any biologically human organism. On another reading, it refers to a person—a being with moral rights. The conclusion of the argument follows only if we assume that all biologically human organisms are persons. But that is precisely what needs to be proven, not assumed. If early fetuses are not persons in the morally relevant sense—that is, if they do not have the properties that make killing wrong—then premise 2 does not support the conclusion.

2. Biological humanity is not morally relevant

Suppose someone argues that embryos and early fetuses are human because they are members of the species Homo sapiens. That is biologically correct. But does being biologically human entail having moral rights? According to major ethical theories, it does not. Consider utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory.

3. Utilitarianism and sentience

Utilitarianism, especially in its classical form as developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that what matters morally is the ability to experience pleasure and pain. Sentience—the capacity to suffer or enjoy—is the key to moral relevance. Bentham famously wrote, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

Embryos and early fetuses, prior to the development of a functioning nervous system, cannot suffer or feel pleasure. They lack consciousness altogether. Thus, according to utilitarianism, they do not have interests, and therefore their lives do not have moral weight. Early abortion does not frustrate any interests or cause any suffering. Therefore, it is not morally wrong from a utilitarian perspective.

4. Kantian ethics and rational nature

Kantian ethics centers moral worth on rational nature. For Kant, persons are ends-in-themselves because they are rational agents capable of formulating and following moral laws. Respect for persons means respecting rational agency.

An embryo or early fetus lacks any capacity for rational thought or moral autonomy. It is not a subject of experience or reasoning. It cannot be treated as an end-in-itself because it is not a self at all. Therefore, under Kantian ethics, early fetuses are not beings toward whom we have moral obligations. It is not a violation of duty to terminate a pregnancy at this stage, since no rational being is being harmed or disrespected.

5. Rawlsian justice and the veil of ignorance

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, constructs principles of justice from the standpoint of the “original position,” where rational agents choose fair principles of cooperation behind a “veil of ignorance.” Behind this veil, individuals do not know their place in society, their abilities, or their conceptions of the good. Importantly, they are rational agents choosing from a position of fairness.

We cannot imagine ourselves as embryos or early fetuses behind the veil of ignorance because such beings lack the rationality and sense of justice that define participants in the original position. The veil of ignorance is meant to exclude knowledge of our particular identity but presupposes that we are rational agents with moral capacities. Embryos and early fetuses do not meet this condition and therefore are not represented in the original position. As a result, principles of justice do not directly apply to them, and early abortion does not violate Rawlsian justice.

6. Why biology alone is not enough

A common objection insists that the biological fact of being a human organism is sufficient for moral consideration. However, if we examine other biological humans, such as brain-dead patients or anencephalic infants (born without the parts of the brain responsible for consciousness), we find that they are often considered not to have full moral rights despite being biologically human. Moral consideration depends not just on species membership, but on the possession of morally relevant features such as consciousness, sentience, or rationality.

What makes killing us wrong is not that we are biological humans, but that we are conscious, feeling beings with interests. Embryos and early fetuses lack minds. Therefore, they lack the very features that make killing wrong in the paradigm cases.

7. Implications for the abortion debate

Given that the most widely accepted ethical theories do not regard embryos and early fetuses as beings with morally relevant characteristics, arguments against early abortion based on biological humanity alone are unconvincing. Instead, we must consider the rights, interests, and autonomy of the pregnant person. The pregnant person is a conscious being with a sense of self and a capacity to value her life and future. Her rights to bodily autonomy, health, and life plans outweigh any claims that might be attributed to a non-conscious embryo.

8. Considering potentiality

Some argue that even if embryos are not persons now, they have the potential to become persons and should be treated as if they already are. However, potentiality does not confer actual rights. A potential president does not have the rights of the actual president. A potential person is not a person.

Moreover, potentiality depends on circumstances. An embryo outside a womb or in a context where the pregnancy will not be carried to term has no realistic potential to become a person. Therefore, basing moral obligations on potentiality is vague and unreliable.

9. Considering continuity

Another objection is the continuity argument: the idea that since we were once embryos, and it would be wrong to kill us now, it was wrong to kill us then. But this argument confuses identity over time with moral relevance over time. Just because an adult was once an embryo does not mean the embryo had the same moral relevance. What matters is not who we were, but what we were like at the time. Moral relevance can develop. We don’t treat infants like adults in terms of rights and responsibilities; morally significant capacities matter.

10. What about late abortion?

This essay has focused on early abortions, which constitute the majority. As pregnancy progresses, the moral considerations change, especially once consciousness and sentience emerge. Even then, abortions later in pregnancy are rare and often performed for serious medical reasons. Philosophical arguments about early abortion do not necessarily apply to late abortion, and vice versa. Still, the ethical focus remains: what morally relevant characteristics are present?

11. Conclusion

Major ethical theories—utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and Rawlsian justice theory—agree on one key point: early fetuses and embryos do not possess the features that make killing wrong. They are not conscious, rational, or capable of experiencing suffering. Arguments against abortion that rely solely on biological humanity ignore what these moral frameworks teach us: morality depends on mental and experiential capacities, not mere species membership. Once we understand this, we see that early abortion is not morally wrong. The real moral concern lies in respecting the rights and autonomy of pregnant people, not in preserving the lives of unconscious biological organisms.

Understanding and accepting this conclusion not only clarifies the ethics of abortion but also encourages more respectful, thoughtful, and rational conversations about one of society’s most emotionally charged issues.

Wednesday, April 30, 2025

Recent essays at 1000-Word Philosophy

I thought I'd do a post about recent essays at 1000-Word Philosophy. Here it is!

Here are our newest essays:

We publish new essays frequently, so please check back for updates. Also follow us on FacebookBlueskyInstagram, and Twitter / X, and subscribe by email on this page to receive notifications of new essays. 

Thursday, March 06, 2025

"I Used to Teach Students. Now I Catch ChatGPT Cheats"

 I Used to Teach Students. Now I Catch ChatGPT Cheats

I once believed university was a shared intellectual pursuit. That faith has been obliterated

Monday, February 03, 2025

Public Philosophy presentation

Feminist Philosophical Fact-Checking” at the Official Blog of IJFAB: the International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics and “Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children?” at the blog of the American Journal of Bioethics

Sunday, February 02, 2025

Atheism versus non-theism(s)

There a certain type of person (often found online) who has a hard time distinguishing atheism -- believing there is not a God -- from the variety of non-theism -- not believing there's a God

I made this image; perhaps it can help. Posting it here since I plan to eventually write up something about this. 




Sunday, January 19, 2025

ChatGPT explains why common anti-abortion arguments and soundbites are mistaken

I am very much opposed to ChatGPT and AI use in educational contexts, but I do wonder if it could help with people who tend to think that expert opinions are a result of some kind of conspiracy or indoctrination or whatever, not a result of actually understanding the issues and arguments. Perhaps people who won't listen to experts will listen to ChatGPT?

ChatGPT explains why common anti-abortion arguments and soundbites are mistaken

Anti-abortion advocates often are willfully resistant to learning about abortion and ethics: they often reject distinctions that are widely known among people who have studied the issues, and enthusiastically accept demonstrably bad arguments. 

Yet, when this is pointed out and explained, they don't accept this and revise their views, believe it or not!

With that in mind, I asked ChatGPT some questions on matters where these types of errors are common. ChatGPT agrees that common responses from anti-abortion advocates are mistaken! 

How might anti-abortion advocates respond to ChatGPT? Will they see it as being duped by a liberal (or is it conservative?) conspiracy in giving these types of responses? Or will they recognize that ChatGPT has a more "fair and balanced" understanding than they do, and rethink their views? 

We might see! Click below for questions and ChatGPT's responses:

  1. ChatGPT: Must everyone agree that a human embryo is a "human being," or else they are irrational?
  2. Chat GPT: Must everyone agree that a human embryo is a person, or else they are irrational?
  3. ChatGPT: Must everyone agree that an embryo or beginning fetus is a "baby" or a "child" or else they are irrational?
  4. ChatGPT: Mammal's bodies start at conception or soon after conception. So human mammal's bodies start at conception or soon after. Does that suggest that abortion is wrong?
  5. ChatGPT: If someone consents to having sex, knowing that pregnancy is a possible outcome, does that mean that they consent to that pregnancy?
  6. Chat GPT: Is an embryo comparable to a sleeping person, in that since it's wrong to kill a sleeping person, is it also wrong to kill an embryo?

What are other questions that should be asked of ChatGPT?

Note: if someone responds, "Whatabout pro-choice people's misunderstandings???" yes, that indeed is a problem too, but this response is likely an attempt to deflect from the more pressing issue, which is misinformed people promoting unjust laws prohibiting and criminalizing early abortions: laws that criminalize morally permissible behaviors are unjust

Tuesday, December 31, 2024

A ranking of intellectual virtues and vices

 A ranking of intellectual virtues and vices: first the "raw data" and then ChatGPT's analysis of it.

Prompt:

For a teaching-related project, I wonder if people would be willing to state what they think the most important intellectual (or epistemic) virtues are, and the most important intellectual (or epistemic) vices are.

3 to 5 ideas of each might be ideal, in the comments.

If you could try to do this without first looking at others' responses, that would be great.

I am trying to get some kind of ranking of importance.

I will share the rankings afterwards.

See below the fold.

Wednesday, December 18, 2024

Everyday Ethical Arguments: Beginning Discussions on Moral Issues

A call for materials for Everyday Ethical Arguments: Beginning Discussions on Moral Issues


Students' opinions on debated ethical issues are often supported by reasons which professional philosophers find not just simple, but simplistic. For abortion, some students will feel that the issue is completely settled by the claim that people have a right to control their bodies. For animal ethics, some will assert confidently that it's OK to eat animals because doing so is "natural." For gun policy, students will try to resolve the debate by saying that we all have a right to defend ourselves against harm. 

Let's call these types of arguments "everyday arguments"—the arguments that people give before they study the issues. Everyday arguments tend to beg the question or depend on unstated premises that, once revealed, can easily seen to be false or implausible. Even when everyday arguments contain the seed of a good argument, they often need to be refined and supplemented.

Everyday arguments pose a serious pedagogical problem: the canonical works in philosophy rarely address them, precisely because they are so often flawed. This makes it difficult for students to meaningfully engage with, for example, Judith Thomson on abortion, Tom Regan on animal rights, or Jeff McMahon on gun control. To students who see these issues as simple and settled by the reasons they have already brought to the discussion, these texts will seem, at best, unnecessarily complicated and, at worst, to miss the point. 

The tendency of professional philosophy to ignore everyday arguments also conveys that philosophy doesn't care about their reasons or experiences. It alienates people from philosophy at a time where we need more than ever to show the relevance of our discipline. 

Philosophy teachers should address everyday arguments so that students are in a better position to appreciate and engage in more advanced discussions of the issues, meeting the students where they are. To do this, though, we need materials. So . . .

See below the fold.

Friday, October 25, 2024

Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children”?

Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children”? 

On the Bioethics Today blog.

Anti-abortion advocates frequently insist that abortion is “killing babies” and “murdering children.” “Heartbeat” bills, or abortion bans, often use this language. Alabama’s Supreme Court even ruled that frozen embryos are children.

While philosophers have much discussed how “persons” and “human beings” are best defined, there is little comparable discussion about defining “babies” and “children.”

Here I argue that embryos and beginning fetuses are not “babies” or “children”: at least, nobody must agree that they are.

See below the fold.